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wilful conduct with reference to the condition of his property
for there are other reasons
plaintiff has not made a case
here. 'l'his court has not announced such a rule for many
years and Oettinger· v.
supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, casts
doubt upon it. This court should reexamine such a rule in
line with the discussion in Fernandez v. Consolidated Fishsupra, 98 Cal.App.2d 91.

[L. A. No. 22972.

In Bank.

June 25,

HARRY l\IL SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. SLENDERELLA
SYSTEMS OF CALIFORNIA, INC. (a Corporation),
Respondent.
[1] Trademarks and Trade Names-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-Under Civ. Code, § 3369, since its amendment
in 1933 (Stats. 1933, p. 2482), either unfair or fraudulent
business practice is sufficient to permit injunctive relief against
unfair competition in use of a trade name; fraud on part of
junior appropriator is no longer sole ground for such relief.
[2] !d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of
women's apparel under trade names of "Slenderella" and
"Slenderella of Hollywood" to enjoin operator of reducing
salons from using trade name "Slenderella" in its business, a
finding that operator's use of such name was in good faith
and without design or intent to capitalize on retailer's prior
use of name is sustained by evidence that, before selecting
name, defendant instituted a nationwide search to avoid use
of a name that would infringe on rights of another person,
that name was adopted after advice of counsel was obtained
that no infringement would result, and that relatively small
size of retailer's business and limited geographical area in
which it is advertised and known, as compared with that of
operator of reducing salon and its affiliates, makes extremely
unlikely the possibility that purpose of operator's use was to
capitalize on retailer's business reputation.
[3] !d.-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief
against unfair use of a trade name may be obtained in situa[1] See Cal.Jur., Trademarks, Trade Names and Unfair Competition, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trademarks, Trade Names and
Unfair Trade
§ 86 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Trademarks and Trade Names,
§ 29 [2, 6, 7] Trademarks and Trade Names, § 32; [ 5] Trademarks
and Trade Names, § 33.
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[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]
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tions other than where the
the basis of relief in such
injury to reputation and good
user
from an identification of it in minds of public with source of
second user's goods or services.
!d.-Unfair Competition-Injunctive Relief.-The senior
propriator may protect, by injunction, his trade
limits fixed
likelihood of confusion of
chasers.
!d.-Unfair Competition-Questions of Law and Fact.-Although many factors may enter into determination whether
use of a specific trade name is likely to result in a confusion
of source, question is primarily one of fact to be determined
from all circumstances of particular case.
!d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of
women's apparel to enjoin operator of reducing salons from use
of name of "Slenderella" used by retailer, evidence does not
compel conclusion that use of such name by a junior appropriator will destroy its novelty and dilute its value where
there were several other state and federal registrations of
name, where retailer testified that he had heard name used
in "the trade circles" in women's wear before he decided to
apply it to his own business, and where name itself is suggestive of uses for which registrations have been obtained,
notably health products, scientific aids to slenderizing, and
wearing apparel for large-sized women.
!d.-Unfair Competition-Evidence.-In action by retailer of
women's apparel to enjoin operator of reducing salons from use
of name of "Slenderella" used by retailer, evidence does not
compel conclusion as matter of law that confusion of public
is likely from use of identical or similar trade names where
the two businesses are inconsistent with one another, where
much of difficulty may be attributed to newness of defendant's
business, and where there has been no evidence of any member
of the public purchasing goods or services of either of the
parties on basis of reputation of the other.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to enjoin assertedly wrongful use of a trade name.
Judgment adverse to plaintiff affirmed.
Samuel Maidman :for Appellant.
Newlin, Holley, 'rackabury & Johnston and Hudson B.
Cox :for Respondent.
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Harry !Yr. Schwartz sued Slenderella
Inc., to enjoin the assertedly wrongful
use of a trade name. His appeal from an adverse judgment
for decision questions as to the sufficiency of the
evidence and the findings to support the judgment.
Some of the facts ·were
by stipulation. Counsel
that the trial (·our't should consider as evidence
also
photographs, advertising matter, the staused by each of the partie;;;, and an affidavit concerna trade-mark search made by counsel for the defendant.
'l't1ese facts are undispnted:
F·or several years, Schwartz has engaged in the retail sale
of women's apparel under thP trade names of '' Slenderella''
and "Slenderella of Hollywood." At the time this action
was tried, he operated two stores in the Los Angeles area,
catering primarily to larger-sized ·women, and specializing
in large-size and half-size garments. He began using the
name "Slenderella of Hollywooll" in 1939 when he opened
his flrst store and filed with the clerk of Ijos Angeles County
a certificate of doing business nnder that fictitious name.
(Civ. Code, §§ 2466, 2468.) Schwartz opened his second
"Slenderella" store in 1947.
The name '' Slenderella'' had beeu used previously in California by one ,J. P. Schwarze, who registered it in 1933 with
the Secretary of State for use in eonneetion >vith the manufacture and sale of wheat flour. At about the same time,
one Henry Semeria beg·an using it for his business of selling
women's apparel in stores located in San Francisco and
Sacramento. Both of these prior uses were discontinued
before Schwartz begall his business.
In 1944 Schwartz registered with the Secretary of State
the names "Slenderella" and "Slenderella of Hollywood"
for use in connection with the sale of women's apparel.
A.pproximately 50 or 60 per cent of the merchandise sold
by him bears one of these names, either on the goods or
their containers. By reason of bis business experience, and
through the care and high standards maintained by him, he
has established a good reputation, and his merchandise has
become known to the users and prospective purchasers of
it under his trade names. He advertises his business under
these names in local newspapers and by mailing cards and
circulars to 17,500 customers. The total annual advertising
cost is between $1,500 and $4,400.
Slenderella Systems is a California corporation affiliated

C.2d
tl1e same name m

salons
maintains
owns nor
nor does it or
"'"'"'"'"+''~ any women's
or
its associates mmmfaeture or sell any women
accessories.
Prior to December, 1
the affiliated
had
operated under the trade name of "Silooete." In that year,
one of the
acquired by assignment the rights of
Erika Schneider in a business using the name '' Slenderella''
as a trade-mark. Schneider had registered the name with
the United States Patent Offiee in 1941 for use in eonnection
with the manufacture and sale of sugarless candy for health
purposes. Those foods vvere not sold in California before
the respondent corporation was formed and began using them
in connection with its reducing eourses.
Before adopting the name "Slenderella Systems," the
affiliates instituted a trade-mark search in each state into
which it was contemplated that the business would extend.
Several previous registrations of the name, both federal and
state, were discovered as well as unregistered uses of it.
The Schwartz registration \vas one of those then found, but
the health system's use of the name was in good faith and
without intent to capitalize on the reputation Schwartz had
built up. Since it began using the name, Slenderella Systems
has advertised it in the metropolitan newspapers of Los
Angeles, and by 1952, had expended in excess of $15,000
for that purpose. The respondent and its affiliated companies
maintain uniformity in their general advertising throughout
the several states in which they operate, their achertising
being substantially the same as that used by them --when they
operated under the trade name '' Silooete. ''
By reason of the similarity in names, Schwartz has received some misdirectrd mail and telephone calls intended
for Slenderella Systems. Some of his customers have gone
to the respondent's salons in the belief that Schwartz operated women's clothing stores at those locations. Other customers have stated to him or his employees that since he is in
the weight-reducing business they would rather flrst reduce
their weight before purchasing large or half-size apparel
from him.

,June

SciiWAR'rz v. Sr~E:"iDERELI,A

SYSTE:\rs

OP

CALIF,

111

l43 C"2d 107; 271 P"2d 8571

to carry on
business under the name ''
his customers
HlH1 business associates will be misled and defrauded into
t}w.t tbe two llllsinesses are one. If he IS denied
his business will be
m
i1 s
-will 1:1 nd in loss of
The trial court mude fi
in accordance \dth the stated
ft further found that the
's use of the
trade Harne '' Slcnderella'' in an unrelated and nonc•:nn
dYe business has not caused damage or
to Schwartz
and has not resulted iu the deception or
of the
public.
the instances
confusion which have
occurred, it found thai " [ s Inch confusion arises from the
similal'ity of namef' and is the result principally of inattention aud rarelessness on the part of persons so confused."
In its opinion, such confusion, "no doubt, has been or will
be of short duration."
In attacking the jm1gment denying an injunction, and
the findings upon which it is
Schwartz contends that
the trial court bas lWcrl? emphasized the defendant's good
faith and the fact that thn parties are engaged in noncompetiug businesses. On the other hand, he argues, it has given
too little -weight to the incidents of confusion e;;;tablished by
the record and to the d1araetcr of "Sienderella" as a fanciful
a IHI cl istinetiYe trade name.
[1] Before the amendment to section 3369 of the Civil Code
in HJ:33 (Stats. 19:\:3, p. 2482). in on1er to obtain injunctive
relief against an assert0cl aet of nnfair com petition in the
nse of a trarle name, it \Yas necessary to establish fraud on
the part of the jrmior appropriator.
American Automobile .1-lssn. v. Amu·ican Automobile 0. Assn., 216 CaL 125,
135-1~~6 [13 P.2d 707].)
'l'he statute now provides that
nn fair rompetition may include an unfair or fraudulent
hnsiness praetiee, a11d either gronnrl is sufficie11t to permit
injunetiYe rnlief. (1JlcCord Co. v. Plotnick, 108 CaLApp.2d
:3~)2, :3!J;) [2:l9 P.2c1 82]; illrw8wecney Enterprises, Inc. v.
Trtrrm/1:no, 106 Cal.App.2rl !104. 5]8-514 [235 P.2d 266]
TVood v. Peffer, 55 CaLApp.2d 1J6. 124 [130 P.2d 220].)
[2] Although Schwartz asserts that "there is an inherent
lad: of good faith when one appropriates the identical trade
name of a \Yell-establishef'l bn;;irwss," the finding of the trial
eonrt, that reflpondcnt's use of the name "was in good faith
and without design or intent to eapitalize upon the plaintiff's
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prior use of said name," is
substantial evidence.
the name, the reThe record sho;,vs that, before
spondent instituted a nationwide search in order to avoid
use of a name that wonld infringe upon the
another
person. The name was adopted after advice of counsel was
obtained that no
would result.
the
small size of Sch>vartz
bw;i ness
limited geographical area in which it is advertised and known.
as compared with that of the
and its
makes extremely unlikely the possibility that the purpose of
the latter's use was to capitalize npon Schwartz's business
reputation.
[3] Since the decision in Academy of Motion Picture Arts
& Sciences v. Benson, 15 Ca1.2d 685 [104 P.2d 650], it is
established, as the respondent concedes, that injunctive relief
against the unfair use of a trade name may be obtained in
situations other than where the parties are in direct competition. (1}facSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tarantino, supra
at 106 Cal.App.2d 513; Johnston v. ,20th Century-Fo.x Pilm
Corp., 82 CaLApp.2d 796, 818 [187 P.2d 4741;
v.
Charles, 77 Cal.App.2d 64, 70-71 [175 P.2d 69]; see 40
San Diego v.
Cal.L.Rev. 571; contra: Yellow Cab Co.
Sachs, 191 Cal 238 [216 P. 33, 28 A.hR 105]; Dunston v.
Los Angeles Van & S. Co ... 165 Cal. 89 [131 P. 115], and
cases cited; Weatherford v. E'ytchison, 90 Cal.App.2d 379
[202 P.2d 1040]; Scutt v. Bassett, 86 Ca1.App.2d 373, 376
[194 P.2d 781] .) rl'he basis of relief in sueh circumstances
is the possibility of injury to the reputation and good will
of the business of the prior user from an identification of
it in the minds of the public with the source of the second
user's goods or services. [4] The senior appropriator may
protect, by injunction, his trade name "within the limits
fixed by the likelihood of confusion of prospective purchasers." (Rest., Torts, § 730, com. b; JJ.IacSweeney
Enter·prises, Inc. v. Tarantino, snpra, at 106 Cal.App.2d
512-513; Winfield v. Charles, supra, at 77 Cal.App.2d 7071.) [5] Altlwugh many factors may enter into a determination of whether the nse of a specific trade name is likely
to resnlt in a confusion of source, the question is
one of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances
of a particular case. (JitacSweeney
Inc. v. 1'araniino, supr·a, p. 518; Winfield v. Charles, supra, p. 71 Pohl
v. Anderson, 18 Cal.App.2d 241, 242 [56 P.2d 992]; see 68
C.J. Trade-Marks, Trade-Names and Unfair Competition,
414-418, § 112.)
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and fanciful name,
many cases have
that
allow

the name used in ''the
circles''
in women wear before he decided
to his own
business.
to which
'fhe name consists of a defined word
has been added a Latin diminutive denoting the feminine
It
of the uses for which
notably health
scientific aids to
large-sized women.
include: slenderets, slenderoids, slendex,
slender form,
slenderlines,
thinderella, Cinderella, slenderize, slenderette, slimderella,
slendorita, slimadonna, and slender-lee.
anu
To hold that confusion of source as to his
the
services wm be unlikely, Schwartz contends,
the factual instances of confusion shown
the
evidence. He asserts that the trial court has
the
serious
of such confusion. Here the parties cater to
the same class of the public, the argument continues, 'and
it is not difficult to perceive that both appellant and respondent are competing for the same
dollar."
[7] Although factual instances of confusion may support
a determination that confusion of the public is likely from
the use of identical or similar trade names, they do not compel
that conclusion as a matter of law.
v.
Pnb79
738; Lerner Stores Corp. v.
162 F.2d 160, 163; American A-uto. Ins. Co. v. Amerwan Auto
184 F.2d
To some
at

reason of the apparent uJxov""'"
catering to the apparel needs
women, while
at the same time conducting a business specializing in the

U4
weight reduction oi'
the trial
stated
the

eond nsions

source.
e uti r•"
ports that determination.
'l'lw jnrlgment is affirme(1.
Gibson, C. J .,

,J.. am1

CARTER, J.--I dissent.
No far~tual
here
stipulation of the
trial enurt. The
was made on
that all the faets were
to. 'rhere remained
the trial court to do
the law to the
a process
involving matters of law, not fact. 'l'hat is the whole tenor
of the reporter's transcript. For
the
stipulation defendant's counsel said: "
great dispnte lwt\we11 m; il" to the fad''· inYolycd in ihc ease."
'rhis is particularly t"ne as to tlw two
discussed
in the majority opinion. whether the
was confused
and whether defendant acted in
faith.
This is further
evinced by the trial court in lis memorandum
It
may be noted that sueh cpinion,
relied upon
the
majority, was not made a part of the reeord in this ease. A
purported copy of it is attaeherl to defendant's brief and
answer to petition for h0a
h~r thh court.
therein that the r·onrt was not
it m iscone<"iYefl th<" law. Ti
sary (the majority concedes it is
foregoing it will appear that the
tivc businesses, not eYen
if competition is a
m're appealing to the same segment of the
women, and to cater to the wishes of tl1at segment.
it is said: "It is not the nsf' of the name that is
*'l'he latter is not r!'ally a faf'tor in tht'

as I will lnter point out.

uot

the trial by
" (emfacts are:
m California
incidents
plaintiff establishment have received
calls intended for the defendant.
said misdirected telephone calls have conof the defendant's name in the Central
of l10S
'' 3. That many of the
's customers and prospective
customers have
as to plaintiff's ownership or connection with defendant's establislm1ents which require the
of time in the explanation
the plaintiff and his
to these inq nir ies.
"4. That certain of plaintiff's customers and prospective
customers have goue to the defendant's locations in Hollywood
and
Hills believing that tl1e plaintiff had operated
women's
shops at the said locations.
'' 5. That customers and prospective customers have stated
to plaintiff and his employees that since defendant is in the
they would rather first reduce their
or half-size apparel from the
'' 6. That the plaintiff and his employees have been asked
prices for reducing treatments,
on recurring occasions to
necessitating
of time to make explanations.
"7. That the plaintiff is considering opening a branch store
in
Hills upon the termination of his lease of the Hollywood store.
'' 8. 'I'hat some
not including numbered street adintended for the defendant's establishments, have
been received by plaintiff;
conversely, I don't think
2\ilr. Cox would have any objection to saying there is a possibility, which >ve don't know
that some of our mail may
have been delivered to the defendant."
There is no escape from the proposition that those facts
show that the public was confused and misled; that it thought
plaintiff's and defendant's businesses were the same; that it
thought a reducing product of or treatment by defendant
had its source in plaintiff's business and plaintiff was re-

confusion

businesses
based upon facts
to the record
more than another way of
that
but is aJso
there can be no actionable infringement of a trade-mark
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person, it was also
other' we have
evident
it wm be seen.
a confusion
while the
purpose
conceivable
that the defendant's
to have
come from
or that the business of the plaintiff
to have
connection with the business
be

18
of the

as

may
of immediate trade but 'may
his reputation, or it may
is
tending his trade to I he
may further be
using the mark.' 'rhe
of his
endangered in various
may be brought into
"While confusion of
litigants are actually
may arise between
from an action
''In a suit for an
for recovery of
be shown."
''Proof
actual
is clear that the
circumstances or ihat it
£u a single instance. In rare cases, the extent to
in whole or
to
confusion can be
of the marks or to other considerations may be open to doubt.
If, however, the
is able to
a substantial
number of witnesses to attest
that, of
course, will indicate the
of confusion
really
may be.'' (Emphasis added Callman, Unfair Competition
and Trade-Marks (2d
, voL 3, p.
Proof of actual
confusion requires the conclusion that confusion is probable.
(See Grocers Baking Co. v.
132 F.2d 498; Standard
Oa Co. v. Michie, 34 F.2d 802; S. S.
Co. v. WingetK1;ckern1:ck, 96 F. 2d
In the
case it was said at
page 987: "\Yhile trademark
issues may be
presented and determined on the basis of a bare
of the marks,
it is evident that an
ilifferent situation is prese!lted wherr> tbe eourt
the marks
heforP it hnt evidence of actual
in the trade in
the nse thereof. \Vhatever the
be upon mere1y
be govenwd
evidence shows as to

the view of and effect
(Ernthat
of
Hence
In addition,
'' and the identical word
and defendant. Both appeal to the
same segment of the
stout women. The leading case
A ttnt .Jemima JYiills Co. v.
&: Co., 247 F. 407 [159
C.C.A.
LH.A. 1918C
, cert. denied, 245 U.S. 672
S.Ct.
62 L.Ed.
is in point There the trademark \Yas used
plaintiff in the sale of flour. Defendant
mxs
it in the sale of syrup. The court reversed the
trial court's refusal of
stating at page 409 : ''To use
the same mark, as the defendants have done, is,
in our opinion, evidence of intention to make something out
of it--either to
the benefit of the complainant's reputation or of its advertisement or to forestall the extension of
its trade. There is no other conceivable reason why they
should have appropriated this precise mark. The taking
wrongful, we think the defendants have no equity to
n.,..,,,.,,~,. them against an injunction, unless they get it from
a eonsideration now to be examined.
"It is said t1Jat even a technical trade-mark may be approby anyone in any market for goods not in competition
with those of the prior user. This was the view of the court
below in
that no one wanting syrup could possibly
be made to take flour. But we think that goods, though difmay be so related as to fall ·within the mischief which
and flour are both food prodshould
and food products commonly used together. Obviously
HJC public, or a
part of
seeing this trade-mark on a
syrup, would conclude that it was made by the complainant.
not do so, if it were used for flatirons.
"''ad.Hcuu's reputation is put in the hands
It will enable them to get the ben<~fit of
and advertisement. 'l'l1ese we
think are property
which should be protected in
" These principles are in line with the legion of cases
holding that in an action for an injunction actual confusion
need not be established; probability is enough. (See cases
collected
Unfair Competition and Trademarks (2d

confusion
of Lerner Stores
addition the court was

name.
Much space is
1P an ''lHIPavor to establish that
defendant did not act in had faith~did not

ness in the same area
defendant was not
take.

or m1sor bad faith is 110t signifibc
the law that

the law.

not intend to deceive, when
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is not an essential factor to the granting of such
is to endeavor to lift oneself by one's own bootstraps.
On the record before this court plaintiff is clearly entitled
to in;jnnctive relief against defendant, and the judgment
should,
be reversed.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Thc evidence and the findings,
in my
entitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief and
reversal of the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 21,
1954. Carter, J., Traynor, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L.A. No. 22991.

In Bank.

June 25, 1954.]

LIVINGSrl'ON llOCK .AND GRAVEL COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES, Appellant.
[1] Zoning-Police Power.-Zoning ordinances, when reasonable
in objrct and not arbitrary in operation, constitute a justifiable
exercise of police power.
[2] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-The rights of users of
property as those rights existed under prevailing zoning conditions at time of adoption of rezoning ordinance must be
protected.
[3] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.--A provision which exempts existing nonconforming uses is ordinarily included in
rezoning ordinances because of hardship and doubtful constitutionality of compelling immediate discontinuance of nonconforming uses.
[4] !d.-Existing Nonconforming Uses.-Zoning legislation looks
to future in regulating district development and eventual
li(1uidation of nonconforming uses within prescribed period

[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Zoning, § 10.
[3] Sec Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Zoning, § 19; Am.Jur., Zoning,
§ 146 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6, 7, 10] Zoning; [5] Constitutional
Law, § 91; [8] Administrative Law, § 19; [9] Administrative Law,
§ 22.

